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THE CRUELTY OF SUPERMAX DETENTION AND THE 
CASE FOR A HARD-TIME SENTENCING DISCOUNT: A 
PRAGMATIC SOLUTION TO A MORAL 
SHORTCOMING 
Mirko Bagaric* & Jennifer Svilar** 
We should send offenders to prison as punishment, not for punish-
ment.   This principle is currently being violated for approximately 
60,000 offenders who are caged in ‘supermax’ prison conditions in the 
United States.  Prisoners subjected to supermax conditions suffer con-
siderably more than those in conventional prison conditions.  Many of 
these prisoners spend up to 23 hours in a small cell with no contact with 
any person.  The conditions are traumatic.  Emerging evidence demon-
strates that these conditions cause considerable psychological and phys-
ical harm to prisoners.  Understandably, there are growing calls to abol-
ish confinement of this nature.  However, there are no signs that 
abolition of supermax conditions will occur soon.  In this Article, we 
make recommendations regarding the manner in which prison condi-
tions should impact the length of a prison term.  We suggest that for most 
prisoners, every day spent in supermax conditions should result in two 
days of credit towards the expiration of the prison term.  Hard-time cred-
its are justified by the principle of proportionality, which provides that 
the seriousness of the crime should be proportional to the hardship of 
the penalty.  The main cohort of prisoners that should not be eligible for 
hard-time credits are serious sexual and violent offenders who are at 
risk of re-offending, as determined by the application of a risk assess-
ment instrument.  Infringement of the proportionality principle is justi-
fied in these circumstances because of a more important aspect of sen-
tencing: community protection.  Providing hard-time credits for most 
prisoners who are forced to endure supermax conditions will not over-
come the ethical problems associated with this form of detention.  Addi-
tional ethical questions are raised by the fact that African American and 
Hispanic inmates are disproportionality subjected to supermax confine-
ment.  The reform proposed in this Article provides a pragmatic solution 
to a considerable failing in our sentencing and prison systems.  Imple-
menting this reform would also disincentivize prison authorities from 
subjecting prisoners to cruel conditions and would do this in a manner 
that does not compromise community safety. 
 
 * Director of Evidence-Based Sentencing Project, Swinburne University. 
 ** J.D. Candidate, University of Tennessee College of Law, 2020.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a serious incarceration problem.  More than 
two million Americans are currently in prison.1  This is the harshest form 
of punishment in our legal system, with the obvious exception of the 
death penalty.2  The United States has the highest prison population of 
all nations, and by a considerable margin.3  Less than five percent of the 
world’s population lives in the United States, yet the United States in-
carcerates approximately twenty-five percent of the entire world’s prison 
population.4 
The United States rapidly moved toward a state of mass incarcera-
tion due to an increasing crime rate and the War on Drugs, which led to 
the adoption of wide-ranging harsh, mandatory penalty regimes.5  These 
changes commenced about four decades ago and resulted in a rapid 
 
 1. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, PRISON POL’Y 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html (explaining 
that the American criminal justice system currently holds 2.3 million incarcerations). 
 2. The United States is the only developed nation apart from Japan that still imposes the 
death penalty. Death Penalty in 2018: Facts and Figures, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/04/death-penalty-facts-and-figures-2018/. The 
death penalty, because of its extreme nature, raises for discussion a number of different human 
rights and normative considerations. Indeed, the literature and analysis regarding the desira-
bility of the death penalty is voluminous. It can only be examined in the context of a stand-
alone dissertation focusing on this issue. This is not a meaningful limitation to this paper, 
given that not all states impose death penalty and that there have been fewer than 1,499 exe-
cutions since 1976. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated May 31, 2019). 
There are twenty-nine states which still have the death penalty. Id. 
 3. See Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List, WORLD PRISON BRIEF 2 (12th 
ed., Sept. 2018), https://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/default/files/resources/down-
loads/wppl_12.pdf. It is widely accepted that the United States has a “serious over-punish-
ment” and “mass incarceration” problem. Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission 
Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 295–96, 307–
08 (2013); see also ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING 
COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, RACE, AND POLITICS 9–15 (2008); David Cole, Turning the Corner 
on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 27–28 (2011); Sharon Dolovich, Creating 
the Permanent Prisoner, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 96–
100 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012); Bernard E. Harcourt, Keynote: The 
Crisis and Criminal Justice, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 970–78 (2012); Andrew E. Taslitz, 
The Criminal Republic: Democratic Breakdown as a Cause of Mass Incarceration, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 133, 153–64 (2011); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 
HASTINGS L. J. 423, 426–36 (2013); Clare Foran, What Can the U.S. Do About Mass Incar-
ceration?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ar-
chive/2016/04/ending-mass-incarceration/475563/. 
 4. Tim Lau, Sentencing Reform Should Be a Top Post-Election Priority for Congress, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/sentencing-
reform-should-be-one-of-congress-top-post-election-priorities. 
 5. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 118–21 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014) 
(for announcement of mandatory sentences by President Richard Nixon in 1971). 
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increase in imprisonment numbers, rising more than four-fold in the 
forty years to 2012.6  In the past few years, this trend has started to re-
verse.  Prison populations have reduced approximately seven percent 
from 2009 to 2017.7  Although this trend is headed in the right direction, 
it is too slow.  At this rate, it would take nearly half a century for the 
United States imprisonment rate to reduce to the international average. 
The mass incarceration crisis has led to loud calls for a reduction in 
prison population.8  Hidden within the number of incarcerated prisoners 
lies an even more acute problem: the brutal and arguably inhumane man-
ner in which tens of thousands of prisoners are confined. 
Confinement in supermaximum (“supermax”) prison conditions of-
ten involves long periods of solitude and access to little more than life’s 
bare necessities.  Supermax is synonymous with solitary and constitutes 
a meaningfully harsher deprivation than conventional prison conditions, 
which typically permit interactions with large numbers of other prison-
ers, visits from friends and relatives, access to educational programs, and 
the capacity to move around in relatively large spatial areas.9  The con-
trast between the conditions in supermax and conventional prison is so 
pronounced that it is verging on intellectual and legal sloppiness to de-
scribe both forms of confinement under the same terminology: “impris-
onment.” 
The principal consideration that should inform penalty severity is 
the principle of proportionality.  This is the view that the seriousness of 
the crime should be matched by the hardship of the punishment.10  This 
principle commands that the additional burden experienced by prisoners 
 
 6. Id. at 13. 
 7. United States Still Has Highest Incarceration Rate in the World, EQUAL JUST. 
INITIATIVE (Apr. 26, 2019), https://eji.org/news/united-states-still-has-highest-incarceration-
rate-world. 
 8. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 5, at 342–53; MICHAEL TONRY, 
SENTENCING MATTERS 134 (1996) [hereinafter TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS]; Albert W. 
Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 85, 89–95 (2005); Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing 
Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37, 40–54 (2006); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sen-
tences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 
89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 627–34 (2005) [hereinafter Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences]; Cassia 
Spohn, Twentieth-Century Sentencing Reform Movement: Looking Backward, Moving For-
ward, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 535, 536–39 (2014); Michael Tonry, Crime and Hu-
man Rights—How Political Paranoia, Protestant Fundamentalism, and Constitutional Obso-
lescence Combined to Devastate Black America: The American Society of Criminology 2007 
Presidential Address, 46 CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5–9 (2008) [hereinafter Tonry, Crime and Human 
Rights]; Michael Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing: A Ten-Step Blueprint for Moving 
Past Mass Incarceration, 13 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 503, 504–07 (2014) [hereinafter 
Tonry, Remodeling American Sentencing]. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part IV. 
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who spend time in supermax conditions should be factored into the sen-
tencing calculus.  Presently there are approximately 60,000 offenders 
enduring supermax conditions in the United States.11  They are suffering 
far more than offenders who are in normal prison conditions.  Their ad-
ditional suffering has no recognition in the sentencing or prison system.  
This is a profound oversight.  The hardship of a prison sentence is cur-
rently measured primarily by its length, a quantitative measure.  How-
ever, this is too simplistic because this measure fails to account for the 
qualitative severity of the punishment. 
We propose that for each day in supermax prison, a prisoner should 
receive two days of credit towards fulfilling his or her term of imprison-
ment.  This approach would make sentencing law and practice more ju-
risprudentially sound, dissuade prison authorities from subjecting pris-
oners to supermax conditions for trivial reasons, and would not 
compromise community safety.  The main exception to this recommen-
dation is for prisoners who are serving time for serious sexual and violent 
offences and who are assessed by a risk assessment instrument as con-
tinuing to present a meaningful threat to the community.  Such prisoners 
should not receive an earlier release date because the objective of com-
munity safety trumps the principle of proportionality. 
Ideally, supermax conditions would be banned or strictly restricted.  
These conditions are so severe that they should be used only in the rarest 
of circumstances.  However, our recommendation is a practical compro-
mise that stops short of imposing stricter regulations on supermax con-
ditions because more significant regulatory changes would face signifi-
cant political barriers.  Medical and empirical data establishes that these 
conditions cause prisoners, who are subjected to them for a considerable 
time, significant physical and psychological ailments.12  The ideal ap-
proach to this form of punishment is to abolish it, except in the rare in-
stances where prisoners are repeatedly and uncontrollably violent to-
wards prison guards or other prisoners.  Indeed, there are now growing 
calls for abolition.13  Despite this, there is insufficient support for sys-
tematically reducing the use of supermax confinement.  Therefore, 
 
 11. Judith Resnik, Not Isolating Isolation, in SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: EFFECTS, 
PRACTICES, AND PATHWAYS TOWARDS REFORM (Jules Lobel & Peter Scharff Smith eds., 
Oxford Univ. Press, forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 20, 22) (on file with author), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3420043; see also ASS’N OF STATE CORR. 
ADM’RS AND THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. INTEREST LAW AT YALE LAW SCH., REFORMING 
RESTRICTIVE HOUSING: THE 2018 ASCA-LIMAN NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF TIME-IN-CELL 9 
(2018) [hereinafter 2018 TIME-IN-CELL], https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Li-
man/asca_liman_2018_restrictive_housing_revised_sept_25_2018_-_embargoed_unt.pdf. 
 12. See infra Part III.   
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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although we do not disagree with calls to effectively abolish the use of 
supermax detention, a pragmatic and workable solution that accepts the 
ongoing regrettable reality of supermax prisons into the foreseeable fu-
ture is necessary.  This Article provides that solution. 
In the next part of this Article, we provide an overview of the his-
tory of the development of supermax conditions and the extent and man-
ner of its current use.  This is followed in Part III by an examination of 
the impact that supermax conditions have on inmates.  We discuss cur-
rent legal efforts to abolish or reduce the use of supermax confinement 
in Part IV.  Our key reform recommendations are set out in Part V and 
summarized in the concluding remarks. 
II. THE EXTENT OF USE OF SUPERMAX CONDITIONS AND THE NATURE 
OF THE CONDITIONS 
A. Overview of Use of Supermax Confinement 
Supermax confinement is commonly used to “isolate people in a 
myriad of ways” within the United States justice system.14  At the end of 
fall 2017, more than 60,000 people were held in solitary confinement in 
the United States.15  Because efforts to track the number of people in 
solitary is completely dependent on officials’ reporting, the actual num-
ber of individuals held in solitary is probably larger (closer to 80,000 to 
100,000).16  Although the number has decreased slightly over the past 
few years as significant shifts in culture have occurred,17 the use of sol-
itary confinement is still prevalent in United States jails and prisons to-
day.18 
Supermax confinement is a “startling . . . yet familiar” way for pris-
ons to discipline inmates in some cases, although allowing prisons to 
control inmates in others.19  It is a versatile tool, often explained as 
 
 14. Resnik, supra note 11, at 20; see also 2018 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 11, at 4. Within 
our Article, the term “supermax” is used interchangeably with “solitary,” as both practices 
focus on long-term segregated housing within prisons. The practice of isolating inmates also 
has other names depending on the length of time an inmate is isolated. Within supermax pris-
ons, one part of the facility, or the entire facility, is created specifically to hold inmates in 
isolation. See Stephanie Wykstra, The Case Against Solitary Confinement, VOX (Apr. 17, 
2019, 4:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2019/4/17/18305109/solitary-confine-
ment-prison-criminal-justice-reform. 
 15. Resnik, supra note 11, at 20. 
 16. Id. at 18. 
 17. See id. at 21. 
 18. See id. at 1. 
 19. See id. at 3, 5 (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229 (2005) (noting that 
“[p]rolonged confinement in Supermax may be the State’s only option for the control of some 
inmates.”)). 
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“protective custody,” “discipline,” or “administrative segregation,” par-
ticularly when a prisoner is viewed as a threat.20  Reasons for putting an 
inmate into supermax may include “incapacitation (preventing the pris-
oner from harming others or vice-versa); deterrence (discouraging future 
bad behavior); punishment (making prisoners suffer because of past bad 
behavior); and necessity (such as a shortage of cells in other parts of the 
system).”21  Some form of solitary confinement is used in all jails and 
prisons in the United States at the federal, state, and local levels.22 
B. History 
Even before the first appearance of solitary in prisons, philanthro-
pists and religious groups endorsed the idea that solitary could help sep-
arate inmates from their sins “in order to facilitate their spiritual recov-
ery.”23  In 1790, solitary made its first appearance in the United States in 
Philadelphia’s Walnut Street Prison, where “incorrigible inmates” were 
required to serve some or all of their terms in solitary.24  The Walnut 
Street Prison was eventually replaced by two other prisons designed es-
pecially for solitary: the Western State Penitentiary in Pittsburgh, which 
opened in 1826, and the Eastern State Penitentiary, which opened in 
1829.25  Charles Dickens visited the Eastern State Penitentiary, after 
which he wrote, “I hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries 
of the brain, to be immeasurably worse than any torture of the body.”26  
Not long after the Eastern State Penitentiary opened, more solitary pris-
ons were created in states such as Massachusetts, Maryland, and New 
Jersey.27  Despite this burgeoning use of solitary, it was quickly aban-
doned, and a 1939 psychiatric report further suggested that solitary 
should not be used in any civilized nation.28 
 
 20. Id. at 6 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 472 (1995)). 
 21. Christopher Logel, Comment, Ghastly Signs and Tokens: A Constitutional Challenge 
to Solitary Confinement, IDAHO L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4-5) (on file with 
author), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3350146. 
 22. Merin Cherian, Cruel, Unusual, and Unconstitutional: An Originalist Argument for 
Ending Long-Term Solitary Confinement, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1759, 1772 (2019) (citing 
Jean Casella & Sal Rodriguez, What Is Solitary Confinement?, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/27/what-is-solitary-confinement). 
 23. Id. at 1774 (citing ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY: PRISON AND 
PUNISHMENT IN EARLY AMERICA 19); see also Wykstra, supra note 14. 
 24. Cherian, supra note 22, at 1773 (citing HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 59). 
 25. Id. (citing HIRSCH, supra note 23, at 65). 
 26. Wykstra, supra note 14. 
 27. Cherian, supra note 22, at 1775 (footnotes omitted). 
 28. Id. at 1776 (citing J.S. WILSON & M.J. PESCOR, PROBLEMS IN PRISON PSYCHIATRY 
25 (Caxton Printers, 1939)). 
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Even before the 1939 report, the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Med-
ley objected in 1890 to the use of solitary as punishment.29  According 
to the Court, “after even a short confinement,” isolation caused the pris-
oner to take on “a semi-fatuous condition,” from which he was unable to 
“recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the 
community.”30  Following this understanding that isolation could lead to 
grave psychological harm, prison authorities largely abandoned the pun-
ishment.31  However, after years of not using solitary, it again emerged 
as a common punishment in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s.32 
Solitary re-emerged during this time for a variety of reasons.  First, 
the prison population increased to the point where solitary was needed 
in order to house all inmates.33  Second, the goal of rehabilitation through 
incarceration was replaced with incapacitation and retribution, and as a 
result, prisons “aim[ed] to punish, not cure.”34  Third, officials used sol-
itary to address gang-related violence that was apparently incapable of 
being controlled via other means.35  As prison populations and violence 
rose, officials sought and secured the ability to impose isolated confine-
ment for those who they subjectively believed were “the worst of the 
worst.”36  Solitary allowed officials to control prisoners—whether they 
actually needed to be controlled or not— and subsequent legislative 
measures made it increasingly difficult for inmates to fight the system.37 
The first modern “supermax” prison was incidentally created in 
1983 when a penitentiary in Marion, Illinois was put on permanent lock-
down after inmates murdered two corrections officers inside.38  A few 
years later, in 1989, Pelican Bay State Prison opened in California and 
was the first supermax prison specifically designed to keep inmates 
 
 29. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890). 
 30. Id. at 168. 
 31. See Wykstra, supra note 14; Cherian, supra note 22, at 1776 (explaining that long-
term solitary confinement became an unusual practice in the United States because of “the 
detrimental effects it had on prisoners”). 
 32. Resnik, supra note 11, at 2. 
 33. See Cherian, supra note 22, at 1776–77 (noting a more than 400-percent increase in 
the prison population from 1978 to 2012). 
 34. Id. at 1777 (citing Elizabeth Bennion, Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Con-
finement Is Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment, 90 IND. L.J. 741, 750 (2015)). 
 35. Id. (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213–14 (2005)). 
 36. Resnik, supra note 11, at 2. 
 37. See id. at 7 (noting that Congress’s enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 §§ 801–10, Pub. L. No. 101–134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) made it harder for inmates to 
access the federal court system). 
 38. Cherian, supra note 22, at 1777 (citing Bennion, supra note 34, at 750–51). 
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isolated.39  By 2004, at least forty-four states had supermax prisons.40  
Today, every single jurisdiction within the United States uses solitary or 
restrictive housing, in which inmates are kept in their cells for a mini-
mum of twenty-two hours per day.41 
C. The Nature of Supermax Conditions: Numbers and Realities 
Although not all supermax prisons are created the same, they all are 
characterized by extreme isolation of prisoners.  Conditions have not im-
proved over time,42 and if anything, isolation has become even more se-
vere, as modern technology has made solitary “more complete and de-
humanizing than ever before.”43  Reports issued by the Association of 
State Correctional Administrators (“ASCA”) and the Liman Center at 
Yale Law School confirmed conditions that include: 44 
• Cells sized roughly 8 feet by 10 feet; 
• Holding of inmates within cells for between 22.5 and 24 hours per 
day; 
• Constant monitoring of inmates; 
• No congregation between inmates; 
• Very limited access to activities or programs; and 
 
 39. Wykstra, supra note 14. 
 40. Cherian, supra note 22, at 1777 (citing Daniel P. Mears, Evaluating the Effectiveness 
of Supermax Prisons, URB. INST. JUST. POL’Y CTR. 1, 4 (2006), https://www.urban.org/re-
search/publication/evaluating-effectiveness-supermax-prisons/view/full report). 
 41. Id. (citing CHARLIE EASTAUGH, UNCONSTITUTIONAL SOLITUDE: SOLITARY 
CONFINEMENT AND THE US CONSTITUTION’S EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 117 
(2017)). 
 42. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682 (1978) (noting Arkansas’s 1970s prac-
tice of putting prisoners in groups “into windowless 8’x10’ cells containing no furniture other 
than a source of water and a toilet that could only be flushed from outside the cell”); Gates v. 
Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting Mississippi’s 1970s practice of putting 
prisoners “in the dark hole, naked, without any hygienic material, without any bedding, and 
often without adequate food.”); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(noting that prisoners in Pelican Bay’s “Security Housing Unit” were put “in windowless cells 
for 22 and ½ hours each day” while also being “denied access to prison work programs and 
group exercise yards.”). 
 43. Cherian, supra note 22, at 1772 (citing Sal Rodriguez, Solitary Confinement in the 
United States: FAQ, SOLITARY WATCH (2015), https://solitarywatch.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/09/Solitary-Confinement-FAQ-2015.pdf); see also Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. 
Supp. 2d 1096, 1098 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (“A video camera rather than a human eye monitors 
the inmates movements.”). 
 44. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 19 (noting that solitary cells were between 45 and 128 
square feet, and that prisoners often spent at least 23 hours in their cells during the week and 
48 hours straight on weekends). 
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• Very limited access to visitors, as in some cases, visits occur 
through a thick glass barrier or via video.45 
Inmates are put in supermax for a variety of reasons, all of which 
provide a way for prison officials to exert control over inmates.  For in-
stance, inmates may be put in solitary for violent acts.46  They may also 
be put in solitary for petty offenses, such as drug use, possession of con-
traband, and use of profanity.47  According to a 2015 report from the 
Vera Institute of Justice, even simple disruptive behaviors may land a 
person in solitary.48  Inmates may also end up in supermax when they 
have an untreated mental illness, have been threatened by other inmates, 
or have reported rape or other abuse by officials.49 
The conditions in supermax are hence very trying, verging on bru-
tal.  They are far more arduous than conditions experienced by prisoners 
in mainstream detention.  Each state system and the federal jurisdiction 
have their own prison systems, and there is no uniformity regarding the 
manner in which prisoners are housed and treated.50  Moreover, in many 
jurisdictions there are different prisoner classifications, ranging from 
low to high security, with conditions generally getting stricter as the se-
curity classification rises.51  However, there are some general standards 
that apply regarding the manner in which prisoners are housed and 
treated. 
To better understand these general standards, one study examined 
data from the Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facil-
ities (“SISFCF”), as well as the Survey of Inmates in Local Jails 
(“SILJ”), to characterize “average” conditions of confinement.52  Histor-
ically, these organizations have collected such data every five to seven 
 
 45. Wykstra, supra note 14 (citing SHARON SHALEV, SUPERMAX: CONTROLLING RISK 
THROUGH SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (Willan 2013)); see also Logel, supra note 21, at 5 (cit-
ing Jones ‘El, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1098). 
 46. Cherian, supra note 22, at 1782 (citing Rodriguez, supra note 42). 
 47. Id. (citing Rodriguez, supra note 42). 
 48. Wykstra, supra note 14 (noting how “disruptive behavior—such as talking back, be-
ing out of place, failure to obey an order, failing to report to work or school, or refusing to 
change housing units or cells—frequently lands incarcerated people in disciplinary segrega-
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 49. Cherian, supra note 22, at 1782 (citing Rodriguez, supra note 42). 
 50. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, A More Perfect System: Twenty-Five Years of 
Guidelines Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323 (Oct. 2005). 
 51. See id. at 324; see, e.g., Michelle Ghafar, Exiting Solitary Confinement: A Survey of 
State Correctional Policies, 64 UCLA L. REV. 508 (Feb. 2017) (examining the various poli-
cies for exiting solitary confinement in different states). 
 52. See Christopher Wildeman, Maria D. Fitzpatrick, & Alyssa W. Goldman, Conditions 
of Confinement in American Prisons and Jails, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 29, 34 (2018). 
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years.53  The data, which are analyzed based on a pool of state and federal 
prisoners and local jail inmates, shows that roughly 40% of these inmates 
reside in either an open dorm or a dorm that is divided into cubicles.54  
About 58% reside in a facility that has air conditioning.55  On average, a 
prisoner will spend more than half of every day in the same space where 
they sleep.56  Somewhere between one-fifth and one-third of inmates en-
gage in formal programming, and for inmates who have children, contact 
does not occur very often.57  Inmates in higher-security prisons “typi-
cally are housed in cells (rather than dormitories), and the facilities them-
selves generally are surrounded by high walls or fences, with armed 
guards, detection devices, or lethal fences being used to carefully moni-
tor and control the ‘security perimeters.’ ” 58 
Some jails and prisons may even offer inmates in the general pop-
ulation amenities such as television, web access,59 or newspapers,60 
while others have required inmates to pay for such amenities.61  Inmates 
in general population are often afforded the opportunity to exercise, 
 
 53. Id. at 34-35. According to Wildeman, Fitzpatrick, and Goldman, “the most recent 
version of the SILJ data is from 2002 and the most recent version of the SISFCF data is from 
2004.” Id. at 34. 
 54. Id. at 37. Extreme temperatures, whether hot or cold, can lead to dangerous condi-
tions for inmates; see, e.g., Jennifer Lackey, The Measure of a Country Is how it Treats its 
Prisoners. The U.S. Is Failing., WASH. POST (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/opinions/the-measure-of-a-country-is-how-it-treats-its-prisoners-the-us-is-fail-
ing/2019/02/06/8df29acc-2a1c-11e9-984d-9b8fba003e81_story.html (noting that 1,200 pris-
oners were left in freezing temperatures and denied extra clothing and blankets at a federal 
prison in Brooklyn); Alexi Jones, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: When States Don’t Provide 
Air Conditioning in Prison, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (June 18, 2019), https://www.prison-
policy.org/blog/2019/06/18/air-conditioning/ (noting that at least thirteen states in high-heat 
regions of the United States do not have universal air conditioning in prisons). 
 55. Wildeman, Fitzpatrick, and Goldman, supra note 52, at 37. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 158-59 (2014), https://www.nap.edu/cat-
alog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-exploring-causes. 
 59. See, e.g., Jerry Metcalf, A Day in the Life of a Prisoner, THE MARSHALL PROJECT 
(July 12, 2018, 7:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/07/12/a-day-in-the-life-
of-a-prisoner (detailing a day in the life of a prisoner, including time spent watching televi-
sion, reading, and drafting emails). 
 60. See, e.g., Brian Ray, Law Provides for Basics, but Jail Amenities Vary by Location, 
THE GAZETTE (Dec. 14, 2009), https://www.thegazette.com/2009/12/14/law-provides-for-ba-
sics-but-jail-amenities-vary-by-location (noting that in a few Eastern Iowa jails, inmates were 
not allowed to read newspapers, while in others, newspapers were made available to the cell 
block). 
 61. See Danny Cevallos, What $100 Can Buy You in Jail Might Surprise You, CNN (Mar. 
30, 2017, 9:46 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/03/29/opinions/pay-to-stay-jails-cevallos-
opinion/index.html (noting that at some California jails, people could reside in “pay-to-stay” 
facilities where $100 would buy them “flat screen TVs, a computer and media room, and new 
beds”). 
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though views on how much time should be granted to exercise pursuant 
to the Constitution vary.62 
Although prisoners may have some access to certain amenities, they 
still live in isolation from the community when housed in mainstream 
jail or prison, and improvements could be made to restore some level of 
human dignity63 to these prisoners.  Law professor Sharon Dolovich sug-
gests that improving prison conditions will lead inmates to feel safe, and 
once this occurs, programs that would help inmates “feel more human” 
may be offered, including “meaningful and challenging educational pro-
grams, programs in the arts . . . vocational training, or any other oppor-
tunities for self-development and for cultivating a healthy self-re-
spect.”64  Although this goal is important for individuals in general 
population, it is even more important for those residing in supermax con-
ditions even though it may be more difficult to afford the same opportu-
nities to these inmates because of the severity of isolation forced upon 
them. 
D. Empirical Data: A Closer Look at the Use of Supermax 
Confinement 
To better understand the incidence of supermax confinement in 
United States prisons, one must consider aggregate data.65  However, any 
data-derived picture of the use of solitary in United States prisons may 
be incomplete or lead to inaccurate conclusions because prison systems 
 
 62. See, e.g., Stewart v. Crawford, 452 F. App’x 693 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (finding 
three hours a week to be enough); Barkley v. Ricci, 439 F. App’x 119 (3d Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam) (finding two hours to be enough); Davenport v. DeRobertis, 844 F.2d 1310, 1315 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (finding that inmates should be provided with at least five hours per week of exer-
cise time); Bono v. Saxbe, 462 F. Supp. 146 (E.D. Ill. 1978), aff’ d in part, 620 F.2d 609 (7th 
Cir. 1980) (requiring seven hours per week); Stewart v. Gates, 450 F. Supp. 583 (C.D. Cal. 
1978) (finding two hours and twenty minutes of outdoor recreation time per week to be 
enough). But see G.A. Res. 70/175, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treat-
ment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules) (Dec. 17, 2015), http://daccess-ods.un.org/ac-
cess.nsf/GetFile?OpenAgent&DS=A/RES/70/175&Lang=E&Type=DOC [hereinafter Nel-
son Mandela Rules]; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TREATMENT OF PRISONERS § 23-
3.6 cmt. at 90–91 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (both generally suggesting that inmates should be 
afforded outdoor recreation time daily). 
 63. The protection of human dignity is one of the foremost concerns of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized stand-
ards.”). 
 64. Sharon Dolovich, Prison Conditions, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 291 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). 
 65. See Resnik, supra note 11, at 17. 
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in the United States do not collect standardized data.66  Furthermore, data 
primarily comes from state-wide systems, which indicates that the stud-
ies focus on prisons and not jails or local institutions that may also em-
ploy some form of supermax.67  As previously mentioned, the population 
of prisoners in solitary has decreased slightly, but solitary confinement 
is still a very common punishment, posing serious dangers to inmates’ 
constitutional rights. 
The ASCA and the Liman Center have conducted a joint project 
since 2012 to better understand and track the use of solitary in the United 
States.68  Initial reports were based on responses from forty-seven juris-
dictions and provided data on prison officials’ policies on “administra-
tive segregation,” which was explained as forcing a prisoner to spend 
between twenty-two and twenty-three hours a day in a cell for thirty days 
or more.69  These reports demonstrated that although the segregation pro-
cess itself was easy, getting out of segregation for prisoners was far more 
complicated.70  In fact, allowing segregation to occur so easily, particu-
larly under the guise that a prisoner poses a threat to other inmates and/or 
prison officials, has led to “tens of thousands of individuals housed in 
profoundly isolated conditions.”71 
The ASCA and the Liman Center issued their 2014 Report, Time-
In-Cell, which, based on reporting from thirty-four jurisdictions, esti-
mated that 66,000 prisoners were in restricted housing.72  These systems 
housed roughly 73% of the 1.5 million inmates in United States pris-
ons.73  For the 2015-2016 report, restrictive housing was defined as “22 
hours or more in cells (single or double), per day, for 15 days or more.”74  
Under these parameters, forty-eight jurisdictions, which housed more 
than 96% of the prison population in the United States, responded that a 
total of 67,442 people were in restrictive housing.75  These data showed 
that a range of between a quarter and a half percent of the prison popu-
lation was in supermax.76 
 
 66. See id.; 2018 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 11, at 9. 
 67. Resnik, supra note 11, at 17. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 18. 
 72. Id. (citing 2018 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 11, at 14). 
 73. Resnik, supra note 11, at 17. 
 74. Id. at 19. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. (citing ASS’N OF STATE CORR. ADM’RS AND THE LIMAN CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEREST LAW AT YALE LAW SCH., AIMING TO REDUCE TIME-IN-CELL: REPORTS FROM 
CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS ON THE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS IN RESTRICTED HOUSING AND 
ON THE POTENTIAL OF POLICY CHANGES TO BRING ABOUT REFORMS 7 (Nov. 2016), 
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The definition of restrictive housing was again modified for the 
2017-2018 report, and the question focused on “how many people were 
held on average (rather than per day) for 22 hours or more for 15 days 
or more.”77  In 2016, more than 1.5 million people were in prison in the 
United States (and there are an additional nearly 800,000 inmates in local 
jails).78  Forty-three jurisdictions,79 which housed 80.6% of the prison 
population, provided data.80  These jurisdictions reported a total of 
49,197 prisoners in restrictive housing, or 4.5% of prisoners.81 
These reports also captured data on how long inmates were kept in 
restrictive housing.82  Part of what makes supermax so difficult for in-
mates is the length of time spent living in such conditions.  In 2015, the 
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Nelson Mandela Rules,83 
which defined solitary within the international community as holding an 
individual for twenty-two hours or more per day “without meaningful 
human contact.”84  The Rules further defined “indefinite” solitary as 
holding an individual for more than fifteen days, calling for the elimina-
tion of its use as it was considered “torture or other cruel, degrading or 
inhuman treatment.”85  Despite having an international definition of sol-
itary, the American Correctional Association (ACA) has established def-
initions of its own.86  The ACA definition of “restrictive housing” re-
quires that a prisoner “be confined to a cell at least twenty-two hours per 
day,” and “extended restrictive housing” is defined as “separating a pris-
oner from contact with general population while restricting [the pris-
oner] to his/her cell for at least 22 hours per day and for more than 30 
 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/aimingtoreducetic.pdf 
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 77. Id. at 20 (citing 2016 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 76, at 8, 15 tbl.2). 
 78. Key Statistics: Jail Inmates, BUREAU JUST. STATS., https://www.bjs.gov/in-
dex.cfm?ty=kfdetail&iid=489 (last visited Sept. 28, 2019); John Gramlich, America’s Incar-
ceration Rate is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW RES. CTR. (May 2, 2018), https://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-incarceration-rate-is-at-a-two-decade-low/ 
(finding that, “[a]t the end of 2016, there were about 2.2 million people behind bars in the 
U.S., including 1.5 million under the jurisdiction of federal and state prisons and roughly 
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 79. Resnik, supra note 11, at 20 (citing E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2016, BUREAU JUST. 
STAT. 4 tbl.2 (Apr. 2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf). 
 80. Id. 
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 82. Resnik, supra note 11, at 20 (citing 2018 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 11, at 14). 
 83. Nelson Mandela Rules, supra note 62. 
 84. Id. at Rule 44. 
 85. Id. at Rule 43. 
 86. Resnik, supra note 11, at 20 (citing 2018 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 11, at 14). 
 2020] THE CRUELTY OF SUPERMAX DETENTION 115 
days.”87  These different definitions impact data showing the number of 
inmates in solitary.  If the right question is not asked, the data will be 
incomplete. 
In some jurisdictions reporting in 2014, many inmates were in su-
permax for more than three years, and in thirty jurisdictions reporting 
numbers from 2013, 4,400 inmates left solitary only to be released back 
into the community.88  The 2016 report involved 54,382 prisoners who 
were kept in solitary in forty-one jurisdictions.89  According to the data, 
99% of these prisoners were in solitary for fifteen days or more—76% 
of them were in solitary for fifteen days to one year and 23% of them 
were in solitary for one year or more.90  The 2018 reports examined the 
length of time individuals spent in restrictive housing within thirty-six 
jurisdictions, detailing time spent for 41,061 inmates.91  About one-fifth 
of inmates confined in restrictive housing were kept in such conditions 
for 15 to 30 days.92  Nearly an additional third were kept in restrictive 
housing for one to three months.93  Roughly a quarter were kept in re-
strictive housing for a year, although nine percent were held for three 
years or more.94  Of these, 1,950 were in isolation for more than six 
years.95 Some inmates have even been held in solitary for decades.96 
Researchers also added context to the 2018 data by comparing in-
formation from jurisdictions that provided data for the 2015-2016 and 
2017-2018 reports.97  Forty jurisdictions provided information for these 
years, and across these jurisdictions, the percentage of inmates in restric-
tive housing decreased from 5.0% in 2015 to 4.4% in 2017.98  The num-
ber of inmates in restrictive housing declined in twenty-eight of the ju-
risdictions, but increased in twelve of them.99 
 
 87. Resnik, supra note 11, at 16 (citing AM. CORR. ASS’N, RESTRICTIVE HOUSING 
PERFORMANCE BASED STANDARDS 3 (Aug. 2016), https://www.asca.net/pdfdocs/8.pdf 
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 97. Resnik, supra note 11, at 20. 
 98. Id. at 21 (citing 2018 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 11, at 97). 
 99. Id. (citing 2018 TIME-IN-CELL, supra note 11, at 97). 
 116 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:60 
E. Race as a Factor 
Based on reporting compiled by ASCA and the Liman Center, Af-
rican Americans and Hispanics are overrepresented in supermax.100  The 
supermax population is also disproportionately young and male.101  
Forty-three of forty-eight jurisdictions surveyed provided details on race 
in the 2015 studies, and according to this data, African American male 
prisoners constituted “40 percent of the total population in those 43 ju-
risdictions, but constituted 45 percent of the ‘restricted housing popula-
tion.’ ” 102  In thirty-one of these jurisdictions, the proportion of African 
American men in solitary was greater than their proportion of the general 
population.103 
To understand these data in context, the study also looked at data 
for white inmates.104  According to the data, thirty-six of the forty-three 
jurisdictions reported that white men were underrepresented in solitary, 
though the degree of under representation varied depending on the 
state.105  For instance, in California, Hispanics constituted 42% of the 
general prison population and 86% of the solitary population, while 
whites constituted 22% of the general prison population and only 9% of 
the solitary population.106  Similar results were seen in Texas, where His-
panics constituted 50% of the solitary population, but only 34% of the 
general prison population, while whites made up 32% of the general 
prison population and 25% of the solitary population.107 
Thirty-three jurisdictions reported on race and ethnicity among 
male prisoners in the general prison population and in supermax for the 
2017-2018 report.108  According to this data, African American men 
comprised 46.1% of the male solitary population, compared to 42.5% of 
the total male general prison population.109  In twenty-four of these ju-
risdictions, the male solitary population had a greater percentage of Af-
rican American prisoners than did the entire male population in those 
jurisdictions.110  As for Hispanics, at least one of the thirty-three 
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jurisdictions did not use “Hispanic” as a racial category.111  However, 
for the remaining thirty-two, Hispanic male inmates comprised 18.7% 
of the male solitary population, compared to 17.2% of the total general 
prison population.112  In twenty-nine of the thirty-three jurisdictions, the 
percentage of white males in supermax was smaller than the percentage 
of white males in the total male prison population.113 
Understanding the general race statistics in a given jurisdiction 
helps clarify why there are such disparities in the number of individuals 
of different races in solitary.  New York, for example, has “a significant 
racial imbalance between [prison] staff and prisoners.”114  In jurisdic-
tions like New York, law professor Andrea C. Armstrong suggests that 
“minority offenders may be more likely to be perceived as a disciplinary 
threat by correctional officers, regardless of an offender’s actual behav-
ior.”115  Because a perceived threat to other inmates may be sufficient to 
land a prisoner in solitary, this may help explain the disparity in num-
bers.  Ambiguous disciplinary standards may also lead to disparate treat-
ment of prisoners based on race because individual guards must interpret 
such standards, and they often do so with their implicit racial biases op-
erating in the background.116  The effect of supermax conditions is dam-
aging to an inmate, no matter his race, and the impact is not just felt 
when an inmate is first put into these conditions, but may last long after 
an inmate returns to mainstream prison or leaves altogether. 
III. IMPACT OF SUPERMAX ON PRISONS 
A. Mental Illness 
Supermax confinement—particularly long-term isolation lasting 
more than fifteen days—has a negative impact on inmates, often leading 
to mental health problems. Inmates subjected to this treatment “slowly 
become insane” and often suffer irreversible effects.117  Furthermore, 
studies show that harmful mental effects of confinement are more likely 
to occur in solitary.118  Of course, the negative impact of solitary is not 
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new. German doctors published several studies between 1854 and 1909 
documenting psychological illnesses among prisoners in general popu-
lation and solitary, concluding that solitary caused many mental prob-
lems, such as “hallucinations, persecutory delusions, hyper-responsive-
ness to stimuli, acute confusion, and memory disturbances.”119  
Additional studies conducted in the mid-1960s concluded that solitary 
can be psychologically damaging.120 
In 2005 alone, forty-four prisoners within the California prison sys-
tem committed suicide, and 70% of these individuals were in solitary.121  
A 2014 study of New York City jails showed that even though only about 
seven percent of inmates spent time in solitary, these inmates accounted 
for nearly half of all events of potentially fatal self-harm.122  Other stud-
ies show that at least one quarter of suicides behind bars happen in soli-
tary.123  When psychologist Craig Haney and criminologist Mona Lynch 
reviewed studies on the impact of solitary confinement in an article pub-
lished in 1997, they discovered common negative psychological effects 
across inmates, including “insomnia, anxiety, panic, withdrawal, hyper-
sensitivity, ruminations, cognitive dysfunction, hallucinations, loss of 
control, aggression, rage, paranoia, hopelessness, lethargy, depression, 
emotional breakdowns, self-mutilation, and suicidal impulses.”124  Fur-
thermore, recent studies have shown that inmates in solitary sometimes 
hear voices and have difficulties tolerating stimuli and concentrating.125  
Even just a few days in solitary may lead to “a shift toward an abnormal 
pattern that is indicative of stupor and delirium.”126  Therefore, it should 
not surprise anyone that many inmates in solitary have “become so des-
perate for relief that they [have] set their mattresses afire, [torn] their 
sinks and toilets from the walls, ripp[ed] their clothing and bedding, and 
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destroy[ed] their few personal possessions, all in order to escape the tor-
ture of their own thoughts and despair.”127 
Personal accounts of time spent in solitary confirm the profound 
impact solitary can have on an individual. Jack Abbott described the 
punishment as being so powerful that it can “alter the ontological 
makeup of a stone.”128  The late Senator John McCain spent two years 
in solitary, noting “It’s an awful thing, solitary . . . It crushes your spirit 
and weakens your resistance more effectively than any other form of 
mistreatment.”129  Extended solitary confinement causes severe mental 
illness in many inmates, even in individuals who are considered healthy 
and have no history of mental illness.130 
B. Physical Harm 
When inmates are placed in supermax, they are also at risk of suf-
fering physical harms.  Studies show that “solitary confinement can not 
only destroy the human psyche, but it can also result in physical deteri-
oration due to the limited access to exercise, physical therapies, as well 
as quality medical and mental health care.”131  Movement within solitary 
is highly controlled, and movement outside of a cell is often made more 
difficult by required restraints, while architectural barriers also make it 
difficult for physically disabled prisoners to reach important areas of the 
prison.132  Additionally, the physical and mental harm caused by solitary 
may result in “long-term disability and additional health care costs upon 
release from prison.”133 
C. Inmates Vulnerable Before Solitary 
1. The Physically and Mentally Disabled 
Although solitary poses the risk of great harm to anyone living in 
such extreme isolation, the dangers to vulnerable groups are even more 
considerable. Individuals with mental illnesses and disabilities are at 
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even greater risk of suffering harm from solitary.134  For this reason, the 
American Psychiatric Association released a statement in 2012 conclud-
ing that absent certain exceptions, people with serious mental illnesses 
should not be placed in solitary.135  The ACA currently restricts the abil-
ity to put an inmate with serious mental illness in “Extended Restrictive 
Housing,” which is where an inmate is confined to his cell for at least 
twenty-two hours per day and for more than thirty days.136  Serious men-
tal illness is defined as: 
Psychotic Disorders, Bipolar Disorders, and Major Depressive Dis-
order; any diagnosed mental disorder (excluding substance use dis-
orders) currently associated with serious impairment in psychologi-
cal, cognitive or behavioral functioning that substantially interferes 
with the person’s ability to meet the ordinary demands of living and 
requires an individualized treatment plan by a qualified mental 
health professional(s).137 
Unfortunately, prisons do not always follow this advice, and indi-
viduals with serious mental health problems end up in supermax.138 
For solitary inmates who already have psychiatric disabilities, these 
disabilities can worsen.139  Aside from the obvious problems that ex-
treme isolation causes, prisoners in solitary often have limited access to 
mental health professionals.140  When accommodations are required but 
not provided, inmates with physical disabilities are also at a disad-
vantage, as they may not be able to protect their mental health by partic-
ipating in mental health-focused sessions.141 
Inmates with physical disabilities are very likely to experience 
worsening health while in supermax, as these individuals are often de-
nied access to the care that will prevent further physical problems.142  
“[S]trict schedules in solitary confinement result in disrupted treatment 
plans where corrections officials refuse to modify schedules to allow 
these prisoners with mobility-related disabilities to take medications at 
specific times.”143  Additionally, inmates in solitary often face strict re-
strictions on the items they may have in their cells, and as a result, in-
mates with physical disabilities may not have access to items they 
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require.144  These restrictions allegedly are in place for safety and secu-
rity reasons, but the restrictions present challenges for individuals who 
need regular access to medical equipment and supplies, such as cathe-
ters, pressure socks, and colostomy bags.145  At times, “access to clean 
medical equipment has been outright denied,” or equipment has been 
provided but was “unsterile, improperly maintained, or otherwise not 
suitable for use.”146 
Another issue arises when solitary prisoners are faced with limited 
access to medical care.  For instance, this can cause problems for inmates 
who are under medical therapy and arrive at prison with specific medi-
cations.147  Inmates usually are not allowed to keep prescription drugs 
with them and are only given access to the drugs under medical staff 
supervision, which may not occur at the optimal time for the drugs’ ef-
ficacy.148  The lack of exercise can also lead to extremely detrimental 
effects on inmates, particularly those with disabilities who require regu-
lar exercise to stay healthy.149  Solitary inmates often have very limited 
access to outdoor recreation, and when it is available, it is usually avail-
able within a small cage, often compared to a “dog run.”150  Although a 
small cage may seem better than nothing, inmates with physical disabil-
ities—particularly those requiring use of a wheelchair or other assistive 
device—often cannot access these areas.151  Furthermore, in some cases, 
an inmate may have an assistive device confiscated, which makes it even 
more difficult for these individuals to participate in activities offered by 
the prison, further isolating them.152 
Supermax conditions have an especially harmful effect on inmates 
with sensory disabilities.  The fact that communication is curtailed and 
primarily occurs through a slot in the door harms these prisoners because 
they “experience profound and heightened isolation due not only to the 
sensory and social deprivation experienced by all prisoners subjected to 
solitary, but also because they face huge barriers to meaningful commu-
nication in correctional environments.”153  Deaf inmates may be further 
marginalized when put in solitary because they are often “left without 
the ability to engage their sense of sight, occupy their minds, and connect 
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with the outside world,” making the solitary experience much more in-
tense.154  As for blind inmates, they are often unable to use their remain-
ing sense of hearing to engage with the outside world when in solitary 
because opportunities for such interaction are very limited.155  Addition-
ally, blind inmates have fewer opportunities for mental stimulation, 
which makes solitary conditions even more harsh for them.156  Mentally 
and physically disabled inmates are not the only ones at risk with this 
practice.  The risks to young people in solitary are also “particularly se-
vere,” with the placement of these individuals in supermax posing a risk 
for serious and long-lasting effects.157 
2. The Young 
The ACA has called for the prohibition of solitary for individuals 
under the age of eighteen.158  For the 2017-2018 report, prisons were 
asked to provide data on prisoners ranging from under 18 to 50, and 
thirty-four jurisdictions responded with information on male prison-
ers.159  These jurisdictions housed a total of 842,941 male prisoners, and 
four of these jurisdictions reported holding a total of sixteen boys under 
the age of eighteen in supermax.160 
D. Overview of Negative Impact of Supermax Conditions 
Regardless of age or whether there is a pre-existing disability, the 
overwhelming majority of data shows that extreme isolation negatively 
impacts inmates.  However, some studies question the seriousness of 
harm from solitary.  For instance, a 2011 Colorado study concluded that 
the evidence showed that “those in solitary for months to a year fared no 
worse psychologically than similar people in the general population of 
the prison.”161  Another study alleges that “solitary has only a modest 
negative impact on mental health.”162  Both of these studies suffered 
from serious methodological problems,163 however, and the corpus of 
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data reveals that living in supermax has a serious impact on the physical 
and mental health of those subjected to these isolating conditions. 
As previously mentioned, one of the biggest problems with super-
max conditions is that the impacts of living in these conditions do not 
stop when an inmate is released.  Supermax conditions can have pro-
longed effects on an inmate, seriously damaging their ability to rejoin 
society.  This was particularly true in the case of Kalief Browder, a 22-
year-old who spent two of three years in solitary on Rikers Island, de-
spite never being convicted of a crime.164  Kalief never recovered from 
the time he spent in supermax and took his own life about two years after 
release.165  Unfortunately, Kalief was not an anomaly, and cases like his 
conflict with the idea that supermax conditions are not harmful to in-
mates.  Cases like Kalief’s also bring the problems with supermax con-
ditions to light, providing officials with a political basis upon which they 
can eliminate or at least significantly lessen the use of supermax con-
finement. 
IV. EFFORTS AT ABOLISHING OR REDUCING THE USE OF SUPERMAX 
CONDITIONS 
A. Overview: Supermax Is Disturbing but not Illegal 
Given the severe adverse consequences of supermax confinement, 
it is not surprising that there are calls to abolish it or at least severely 
curtail its use.  Despite abhorrent conditions and evidence of considera-
ble harm caused by supermax conditions, courts addressing the punish-
ment itself have yet to ban the practice.166  Even so, there are persuasive 
arguments in favor of a complete ban of the practice.  We now provide 
an overview of relatively recent developments relating to efforts to ban 
or reduce the incidence of supermax confinement. 
The prison’s need to control and discipline inmates has made su-
permax confinement a typical and ordinary part of prison life, which ar-
guably limits inmates’ constitutional rights despite its common occur-
rence.  Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that 
“conviction and incarceration extinguishe[s] most liberty interests of 
prisoners,” inmates still have some rights, and the overuse of this 
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supermax confinement can potentially violate those rights.167  The Su-
preme Court, however, leaves many punitive decisions—such as 
whether to impose solitary confinement—to prison officials unless an 
inmate shows an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life.”168  Because solitary has become so 
common in prison, it may be very difficult for an inmate to show an 
“atypical and significant hardship” when he has to endure conditions to 
which other inmates are also subjected.169 
How does an inmate make a showing of an “atypical and significant 
hardship” when supermax conditions are so typical in United States pris-
ons?  Judith Resnik argues that because supermax is so typical, we have 
become “collectively numb” to the harms caused by supermax condi-
tions.170  By equating typical with legal, which has been done by the 
courts when applying the “atypical and significant hardship” standard, 
prison officials have retained unchecked authority to incarcerate inmates 
however they please.171  Resnik suggests that instead of comparing the 
atypical to the typical, “constitutional law should require us all to undo 
that which has come to be the commonplace and typical in United States 
prisons.”172 
B. Constitutional Analysis: Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Although most agree that supermax is far too common in the United 
States, some scholars take a different approach in their arguments for 
why the practice should be abolished.  For instance, Merin Cherian 
makes a constitutional argument for abolishing supermax, noting that 
under an original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause,173 “a punishment is cruel and unusual if it is overly harsh in light 
of longstanding practice.”174  Cherian’s approach suggests that although 
common in the United States, supermax does not comply with 
longstanding practice because there was a time when it was not used, 
making supermax unusual in the grand scheme of punishment.  The Su-
preme Court uses an “evolving standards” approach when construing the 
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Eighth Amendment, which, according to the Court, “must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.”175  According to Cherian, there are many prob-
lems with this approach, one of which is that the Court fails to really 
analyze what “unusual” means in the context of the Clause.176  Although 
the Supreme Court defines “unusual” as “something different from that 
which is generally done,”177 some scholars supporting the originalist 
view argue that it means “contrary to ‘long usage.’ ” 178 
Applying this originalist definition, supermax should be considered 
unusual because of the length of its use. At one point, it fell out of use 
for more than a century.179  Although the practice re-emerged in the 
1970s and 1980s and has been in use since, this length of time is not 
sufficient to deem it a usual practice.180  Supermax can only be consid-
ered usual if it has been “continuously employed throughout the juris-
diction for a very long time.”181  Supermax was not used continuously, 
as it was nearly abandoned within two decades after being created,182 
and it has not been used for a “very long time” since its resurgence.183  
Cherian argues that “a period of thirty-five years is not long enough to 
incorporate a punishment into the common law,” even though history 
does not provide a specific time period for which a punishment must be 
used to be defined as “usual.”184  The Court’s application of the current 
evolving standards does not leave room for the originalist definition of 
“unusual,” but perhaps the Court should reconsider its understanding of 
the word.  As Cherian notes, unusual does not mean “strange” or “out of 
the ordinary.”  Its meaning is “contrary to ‘long usage.’ ” 185  Since su-
permax has not been practiced continuously for a sufficient period of 
time to make it usual, it is, by definition, an unusual practice that violates 
the Eighth Amendment and should be abolished.186 
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Similar issues exist with the word “cruel” within the Clause.  It may 
be understood to refer to the intent of the punisher or to refer to the actual 
effects of the punishment.187  The latter understanding should arguably 
apply, though the former has often been applied.  To show that condi-
tions are cruel, the Supreme Court requires that the inmate “must show, 
at a minimum, that a prison official acted with deliberate indiffer-
ence.”188  However, as both Cherian and John F. Stinneford argue, this 
does not apply the correct definition of “cruel,” under which “the cruelty 
of a punishment should turn on the effect of the punishment, rather than 
the intent of the punisher.”189  Applying this definition in conjunction 
with the originalist definition of “unusual” shows that supermax is cruel 
and unusual because it is “unjustly harsh in light of longstanding prac-
tice.”190  Although at first glance it may not appear as cruel as historical, 
atrocious punishments, it is certainly “a quiet and invidious form of pun-
ishment that amounts to torture.”191  The proper comparison for deter-
mining the harshness is whether supermax is significantly harsher than 
the punishment it replaces, which for these purposes, is confinement in 
the general prison population.192  When comparing supermax confine-
ment to confinement in the general population, the impact on supermax 
prisoners is far worse and sometimes irreparable.193  When compared to 
being confined in general population, supermax is unjustly harsh, mak-
ing it cruel under the Eighth Amendment.194  Using the cruel effects def-
inition of “cruel” better protects inmates’ rights by allowing individuals 
in supermax to more effectively litigate claims regarding prison condi-
tions, thereby giving a voice to those trapped in supermax.195 
According to Christopher Logel, “[t]he Supreme Court has never 
found that a purely mental harm rises to the level of an Eighth Amend-
ment violation. However, it has never categorically held that 
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psychological harm is beyond the scope of the Eighth Amendment, ei-
ther.”196  Thus, theoretically, is possible to challenge the use of supermax 
conditions on this basis.  If the Court finds that mental harm suffered as 
a result of prison conditions is an Eighth Amendment violation, then su-
permax inmates could be helped because mental harm is such a common 
side effect of living in supermax conditions.  Recognizing that mental 
harm as a result of supermax conditions is such a serious, widespread 
problem may also lead the Court closer to disapproving of the practice 
altogether. 
C. Constitutional Analysis: Due Process Clause 
Inmates have also attempted to argue against supermax under the 
Due Process Clause, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.197  Inmates in supermax may bring a procedural due process claim 
when their lives or liberty are threatened by government action.198  Liti-
gants challenging solitary under the premise of due process often allege 
that solitary is “not an inherent feature of sentences,” and as such, they 
have “a liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement.”199  Just be-
cause a person is imprisoned does not mean his liberty interests fall away 
completely, and being forced to live in supermax conditions often trig-
gers a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.200  Whether solitary 
violates a cognizable liberty interest is determined by looking at “(a) the 
particular conditions of solitary confinement, (b) the duration of stay 
within those conditions, and (c) the difference between the solitary con-
finement conditions and those generally prevailing in the rest of the 
prison system.”201  Once a liberty interest is established, the court must 
determine whether “the process afforded solitary confinement prisoners 
[is] constitutionally sufficient.”202  However, inmates have not been 
overly successful in bringing claims under the Due Process Clause.  In 
2005, the Court decided in Wilkinson that the entire supermax system in 
Ohio, which was run and reviewed only by prison officials, was adequate 
under the Due Process Clause.203 
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D. Other Arguments 
Inmates may also challenge their confinement to supermax by 
showing that they have been deprived of a “single, identifiable human 
need.”204  Although studies show that social interaction is important to 
the physical and mental health of inmates in supermax, many courts have 
rejected the classification of social interaction as an “identifiable human 
need.”205  Additionally, the majority of courts—but not all—206 require 
a showing of physical harm to proceed on a challenge to confinement 
under the Eighth Amendment.207 
One of the biggest issues with supermax is that it does not achieve 
its primary goal—providing and maintaining safety and security within 
prison walls.208  According to a 2016 report from the National Institute 
of Justice: “There is little evidence that administrative segregation has 
had effects on overall levels of violence within individual institutions or 
across correctional systems.”209  There have only been a few studies on 
the impact of the increased usage of supermax; yet none of these studies 
show a reduction in violence among inmates within the facilities.210  
There is also little evidence that supermax conditions “meaningfully im-
prove safety for staff in prisons and jails.”211 
Not only is the protection of prison officials a primary goal of su-
permax, the protection of vulnerable groups, such as individuals with 
disabilities and members of the LGBTQIA+ community, is also im-
portant and has been identified as a reason for confining individuals in 
supermax.212  There are, however, other more desirable options for keep-
ing members of vulnerable groups safe without resorting to supermax.213  
For example, the Vera Institute, in conjunction with the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Bar Association, 
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recommends separating people if necessary for safety reasons but ensur-
ing that they still have full access to programming and services.214 
Having a disability or being a member of a specific vulnerable 
group should never be considered a valid reason for putting inmates in 
supermax and further isolating them.  Logel focuses primarily on in-
mates’ mental health, arguing that there should be no difference between 
preexisting serious mental illness and mental illness caused by supermax 
confinement.215  According to Logel, all prisoners have a “categorical 
right to be free from confinement-caused severe mental illness.”216  The 
right to be free from severe mental illness should arguably be considered 
a “single, identifiable human need” under an Eighth Amendment analy-
sis, and even if severe mental illness does not affect all inmates in su-
permax, it is predictable and widespread enough that the significant risk 
of an inmate developing severe mental illness even after a short time in 
solitary is sufficient to create a claim under the Eighth Amendment.217  
These arguments receive some support from courts that have concluded 
that a significant risk of harm is sufficient for a cognizable claim under 
the Eighth Amendment.218  Although these arguments have some nor-
mative appeal, they have not proven to be effective jurisprudential weap-
ons against the legality of supermax conditions. 
E. New Rules and Limitations 
Given that constitutional and other strict legal arguments have not 
been effective in abolishing supermax conditions, some advocates have 
attempted to attenuate the use of supermax confinement by narrowing 
the situations in which it is deemed appropriate.  Another goal of recent 
research into supermax confinement was to track rules and policies for 
the use of restrictive housing across multiple jurisdictions.  In 2012, most 
correctional rules gave officials wide discretion in placing inmates in 
restrictive housing.219  In 2015, the ASCA publicly admitted that the use 
of isolation in prisons was a “grave problem,” noting that the practice 
should be eliminated or, at the very least, reduced.220  The following 
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year, the ACA called for limits on the use of isolation.221  In 2017, Col-
orado followed the ACA’s recommendations by instituting “some of the 
most progressive policies in the country, limiting solitary confinement 
to the UN standard222 of no more than 15 days.”223  North Dakota has 
also taken measures to reform the use of solitary within the state.224 
More broadly, although supermax has been accepted for quite some 
time in the United States, views have begun to change, particularly after 
conditions of prisoners at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo Bay became a 
topic of public debate after the attacks of September 11.225  In 2005, the 
U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Wilkinson v. Austin that prisoners 
may have a liberty interest when placed in isolation.226  This recognition 
provided inmates the opportunity to argue that officials had violated their 
constitutional rights.227  Some forms of solitary were seen as actionable, 
allowing prisoners to seek refuge from abysmal conditions and long-
term isolation. 228  Furthermore, the Court continued to modify its stance 
on supermax, eventually recognizing the negative effects on prisoners.229  
Justice Kennedy, who had previously defended solitary as a necessary 
part of prison, appeared to steer this modification, noting that the “judi-
ciary may be required . . . to determine whether workable alternative sys-
tems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so, whether a correctional 
system should be required to adopt them.”230  Shortly after Justice Ken-
nedy’s comment, Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg echoed the 
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sentiment, condemning “[t]he dehumanizing effect of solitary confine-
ment.”231 
Although these opinions were not majority decisions, sentiments of 
this nature paved the way for broader social and legal movements to 
bring attention to the suffering caused by supermax confinement.  For 
instance, the ACLU’s National Prison Project launched a “Stop Solitary” 
campaign in 2010, making public various atrocities that prisoners 
faced.232  The media also became involved in the argument against soli-
tary by bringing attention to the suicides of men in pre-trial detention at 
Rikers Island and the hunger strikes by inmates at Pelican Bay, Califor-
nia.233  In 2014, directors of several prison systems placed limitations on 
the use of supermax after determining it was “the right thing to do.”234 
By 2018, the “bases for entry” into supermax confinement had be-
come more narrow across many prisons.235  For example, certain behav-
iors, like horseplay, that formerly provided a basis for placing inmates 
into restrictive housing were no longer sufficient.236  Additionally, some 
of the jurisdictions expanded oversight of placement into restrictive 
housing, modified the amount of time that would be spent in-cell, offered 
additional opportunities for social interaction through various programs, 
and considered less restrictive alternatives.237  Many jurisdictions’ ef-
forts to narrow entry bases and improve oversight were guided by the 
ACA standards.238  As noted above, state legislation has also contributed 
to improving the solitary situation, as legislators have set out to protect 
vulnerable groups or mandate that prisons report data on the use of soli-
tary.239  As of April 2019, New York and New Jersey were considering 
legislation offering reforms for all those incarcerated.240 
International standards have also been developed to guide the use 
of supermax conditions.  For instance, the Nelson Mandela Rules pre-
clude the placement of prisoners with mental and/or physical disabilities 
in supermax when such disabilities would be made worse by supermax 
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conditions.241  Ultimately, under these rules, solitary is to “be used only 
in exceptional cases as a last resort, for as short a time as possible and 
subject to independent review.”242  There is no consensus regarding 
whether it is desirable to apply these rules in the domestic setting, and 
these rules are not always harmonious with other proposed standards.  
Although the ACA has called for limits on supermax confinement, its 
policies create distinctions that could lead to more harm than following 
the Nelson Mandela Rules might.  For instance, the ACA’s definition of 
solitary addresses the holding of prisoners for more than thirty days, 
while the definition under the Nelson Mandela Rules stops at fifteen 
days.243  Even though the ACA does not allow prisoners who were under 
the age of eighteen, pregnant, or suffering from mental illness to be 
placed in “extended restrictive housing,” the standards appear to leave 
open the question of whether these individuals could still be placed in 
“restrictive housing” for up to thirty days.244 
In limited instances, state legislators in several states have also in-
troduced limits to the use of supermax conditions.  For example, Massa-
chusetts barred placing pregnant prisoners in solitary, as well as the use 
of an individual’s gender or sexual orientation as reasons to place a pris-
oner into solitary.245  Massachusetts was joined by other jurisdictions 
that placed limits on the use of solitary for inmates with serious mental 
illnesses.246  Massachusetts also ensured that individuals held in solitary 
for sixty days or more were given “access to vocational, educational, and 
rehabilitative programming.”247  Some states have also condemned the 
use of solitary for juvenile inmates, and Colorado has ended the use of 
solitary for fifteen days or more and for twenty-two hours or more in a 
cell.248  Colorado now requires that inmates in supermax are allowed out 
of their cells “for a minimum of four hours per day, at restraint tables 
with up to four other inmates, for programming and other activities.”249  
Colorado also precludes the placement of the mentally ill in supermax.250  
In Colorado, if correctional officers and clinicians determine that mental 
illness was the cause of a disciplinary incident, “the offender is taken out 
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of the disciplinary process and given treatment.”251  This is far removed 
from other jurisdictions where mental health treatment is often withheld. 
F. Overview of Attempts to Abolish or Limit the Use of Supermax 
Confinement 
As we have seen, supermax conditions place severe restrictions on 
prisoners and inflict a high degree of suffering on them.  These condi-
tions often have detrimental mental and physical consequences. There 
are compelling normative reasons for abolishing supermax confinement.  
However, the numerous legal challenges which have been made to su-
permax confinement have, by and large, not been successful.  Greater 
community awareness of the brutality of supermax has in some circum-
stances encouraged state lawmakers to limit the use of supermax con-
finement.  However, the reality is that supermax conditions remain com-
monplace, and this is likely to continue to into the foreseeable future.  In 
light of the likely ongoing significant prevalence of supermax condi-
tions, more pragmatic measures must be employed to address supermax 
confinement. It is to this that we now turn. 
V. THE CASE FOR HARD-TIME CREDITS 
A. Overview of Argument 
Offenders should be sent to prison as punishment, not for punish-
ment.252  It is incontestable that supermax confinement is far more ardu-
ous than conventional prison conditions.  The hardship of imprisonment 
is normally measured in quantitative terms, i.e. by the length of the 
prison term.  But the deprivations experienced by inmates also have a 
qualitative aspect.  It is hard to objectively contrast the extent of depri-
vation of one prison term to that of another because although most pris-
ons are run along relatively similar lines, they all have minor differ-
ences.253  However, the difference between supermax conditions and 
typical prison conditions are so pronounced that they differ not in degree, 
but in nature.  This logically should result in a different calibration of the 
punitiveness of this sanction, whereby each day spent in supermax con-
ditions should result in a reduction of the prison time that an offender is 
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required to serve.  This approach will not directly abolish supermax con-
finement but will reduce the overall harshness of sanctions imposed on 
prisoners who are subjected to supermax conditions and should logically 
operate to provide prison officials a disincentive from the overuse of 
such confinement, thereby reducing the incidence of this form of pun-
ishment. 
There is, however, one group of prisoners to whom such credits 
should not apply, and this group consists solely of sexual and violent 
offenders who are at a substantial risk of reoffending.254  This group war-
rants special treatment because the interest of community safety out-
weighs the burden of the disproportionate punishment inflicted on su-
permax inmates. 
We now discuss the rationale for these reform proposals in greater 
detail. 
B. The Nature of Punishment 
The argument for hard-time credits for supermax prisoners is based 
on the underpinnings of punishment and the principle of proportionality.  
Ultimately, sentencing concerns the infliction of punishment. The below 
discussion establishes that in evaluating the nature and extent of punish-
ment, it is important to factor in the actual impact of the hardship on the 
offender.255  If a sanction imposes an additional burden on a certain cat-
egory of offenders, it is necessary to incorporate the actual total burden 
of the punishment into sentencing calibrations. 
There is no universally accepted definition of punishment. In defin-
ing punishment, some commentators focus on its association with 
guilt.256  Antony Duff defines punishment as “the infliction of suffering 
on a member of the community who has broken its laws.”257  Similarly, 
John McTaggart defines punishment as “the infliction of pain on a per-
son because he has done wrong.”258  Andrew von Hirsch states that 
“[p]unishing someone consists of doing something painful or unpleasant 
to him, because he has purportedly committed a wrong, under circum-
stances and in a manner that conveys disapprobation of the offender for 
his wrong.”259 
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A key aspect of punishment that has been identified by many schol-
ars is the association between punishment and pain or suffering. Chin 
Liew Ten states that punishment “involves the infliction of some un-
pleasantness on the offender or it deprives the offender of something 
valued.”260  Others have placed somewhat emotive emphasis on the hurt 
that punishment seeks to cause and assert, for example, that “[t]he intrin-
sic point of punishment is that it should hurt – that it should inflict suf-
fering, hardship or burdens.”261  Honderich is somewhat more expansive 
regarding the type of evils that can constitute punishment: punishment 
involves “the infliction of something which is assumed to be unwelcome 
to the recipient: the inconvenience of a disqualification, the hardship of 
incarceration, the suffering of a flogging, exclusion from the country or 
community, or in extreme cases, death.”262 
Thus, there are numerous definitions of “punishment.”  From the 
above accounts, it seems there is consensus on two points.  Core aspects 
of punishment are that it consists of: (i) a hardship or deprivation, and 
the taking away of something of value;263 and (ii) it is imposed for a 
wrong actually committed or perceived to have been committed. The 
first requirement is incontestable: an experience that benefits an individ-
ual or has no impact on them is not punishment.  The second requirement 
is equally essential.  Without this stipulation, any experience that consti-
tuted a detriment could be termed a punishment.  Clearly, it is not cred-
ible to describe an illness, failure in an exam, or a marriage break-up as 
a form of punishment. 
In short, a punishment must be a form of deprivation, and there 
must be a connection between the deprivation and violation of a norm.  
Thus, punishment by its very nature involves the infliction of a degree 
of inconvenience or hardship on an offender.  An important aspect of 
this is that hardship comes in degrees and the intensity can vary consid-
erably.  This is a principle which is accepted without reservation in rela-
tion to most criminal sanctions.  Thus, for example, there is no question 
that prison is harsher than either a small fine or home arrest.  By analogy, 
it follows that supermax detention constitutes a more serious form of 
sanction than conventional prison conditions. 
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C. The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality requires that the seriousness of the 
crime be matched by the harshness of the penalty.264  Proportionality is 
explicitly incorporated into sentencing law in the United States.  It is a 
constitutional requirement of the sentencing regimes of ten states265 and 
is a core principle of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.266  The Guide-
lines Manual states that one of the three objectives underpinning the Sen-
tencing Reform Act is “proportionality in sentencing through a system 
that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of 
differing severity.”267 
Broken down to its core features, proportionality has two limbs.  
The first is the seriousness of the crime, and the second is the harshness 
of the sanction.  The principle has a quantitative component—the two 
limbs must be matched.  In order for the principle to be satisfied, the 
seriousness of the crime must be nearly equal to the harshness of the 
penalty.  The main criterion regarding the sanction harshness limb is the 
extent to which the penalty sets back the interests of offenders.268  Given 
that supermax prisoners suffer more than prisoners who are in main-
stream conditions, it follows that proportionality requires the type of 
confinement to be factored into sentencing.269 
D. The Magnitude of the Premium for Supermax Confinement 
The next issue is the penalty reduction that should be accorded to 
offenders for time spent in supermax detention.  The lack of an objective 
criterion answer for determining a one-size-fits-all reduction raises the 
question of what substitution would be most appropriate.  There is no 
established framework for this process.  The concept of a sanction unit 
has been suggested; however, attempts to inject content into such an 
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approach have not been adopted or even developed with a high degree 
of specificity.270  This lack of specificity is primarily due to the large 
number of variables involved and the high degree of subjectivity that 
exists regarding the extent to which individuals covet different types of 
interests.  There is no way, for example, to equate a fine of a certain 
amount271 with the burden of imprisonment for a day.  It is likely that 
some people would prefer to spend a day in prison rather than, for ex-
ample, pay a fine of $1,000 or be denied internet access for a week.  But 
other individuals would rather pay a fine of almost any amount to avoid 
even a day in prison. 
Despite such complexities and inevitable approximations that are 
involved in comparing and contrasting the respective hardships associ-
ated with sanctions, intellectual rigor and doctrinal transparency require 
that relevant conclusions and calculations should be expressly set out.  
We propose that each day in supermax conditions should count for two 
days of normal imprisonment.272  Thus, for example, if a prisoner spends 
all of his or her term in supermax conditions, then he or she would be 
released from prison at the expiration of half of the prison term. 
This formula stems from relative comparison on the deprivations 
stemming from the two forms of prison conditions.  As we have seen, 
supermax confinement involves prisoners being stripped of effectively 
everything that is meaningful in day-to-day life.  These prisoners lose 
total control of their environment.  They are devoid of any meaningful 
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form of stimulation and prevented from engaging in many types of ac-
tivity.  Contact with other people is negligible. It is boredom, passivity, 
and loneliness at the highest scale.  As we have seen, it often also leads 
to more enduring mental and physical pain.  Prisoners in the mainstream 
environment are deprived of their physical liberty; however, they are still 
capable of engaging in a degree of physical mobility, socializing with 
other prisoners, and having some control over their activities.  Hence, 
supermax conditions are far more burdensome than normal prison con-
ditions.273 
Logically, the correct adjustment for supermax confinement prison 
compared to conventional prison arises when prisoners who have expe-
rienced both forms of incarceration would be indifferent to whether they 
served their time in normal prison conditions or supermax confinement.  
However, given the diversity of the profile of prisoners and the differing 
degrees of resilience and tolerance that they would have for supermax 
conditions, this adjustment would vary significantly across the inmate 
population.  For this reason, the suggestion that supermax confinement 
should count for two days in prison is an approximation of the relative 
deprivations of the two forms of punishment. 
The increased deprivation associated with supermax conditions is 
arguably more than twice as burdensome as normal prison conditions.  
However, this formula has several advantages. First, it is numerically 
simple to understand and implement.  Second, if an error is to be made 
in terms of comparing the two forms of prison conditions, it should err 
on giving less time reduction for time spent in supermax conditions.  
This is because an overly generous time reduction could result in a sig-
nificant number of prisoners electing to serve at least part of their terms 
in supermax confinement.  Of course, this is an election that cannot be 
directly actioned by way of prisoner request, but it could be orchestrated 
by prisoners who deliberately misbehaved in order to be sent to super-
max confinement by prison officials.  Prisoners should be prevented or 
deterred from gaming the system.  Such mechanisms are discussed in 
subsection F of this Article, after we examine an exception to our rec-
ommendation. 
E. Serious Sexual and Violent Offenders – No Hard-Time Credits 
Warranted 
The principle of proportionality, which underpins our argument in 
favor of a credit adjustment for supermax conditions, is not absolute and, 
hence in some circumstances, it can be trumped by other sentencing 
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objectives.274  To this end, the most important sentencing aim is protec-
tion of the community, which in fact is the ultimate aim of the criminal 
law.275 
All crime is harmful and, hence, there is a need to protect the com-
munity from all types of offenses.  However, empirical data shows that 
certain offenses are especially damaging to individuals.  A number of 
studies have measured the impact of certain offense categories on vic-
tims.  Empirical data show that serious sexual and violent offenses often 
impact victims far more profoundly than other forms of crime.   
Rochelle Hanson, Genelle Sawyer, Angela Begle, and Grace Hubel 
following an extensive review of many studies which examined the ef-
fects of violent and sexual crimes on crimes noted these crimes often 
lead to significant long-term harm.276  The report concluded: 
In sum, findings from the well-established literature on general 
trauma and the emerging research on crime victimization indicate 
significant functional impact on the quality of life for victims. How-
ever, more research is necessary to understand the mechanisms of 
these relationships and differences among types of crime victimiza-
tion, gender, and racial/ethnic groups.277 
The study showed that victims of violent crime, and sexual crime 
in particular, have difficulties in maintaining intimate relationships;278 
compromised parenting skills for (female victims of partner violence) 
(although this finding was not universal);279 higher rates of unemploy-
ment;280 high levels of dysfunction in social and leisure activities281 and 
high medical costs.282 
Further, a literature review published in 2006 found that victims of 
violent crime were 2.6 times as likely as non-victims to suffer from de-
pression283 and many females (one in twenty) who had been seriously 
sexually assaulted attempted to commit suicide.284 
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Chester L. Britt, in a study examining the effects of violent and 
property crime on the health of 2,430 respondents, noted that most vic-
tims of crime reported reduced levels of well- being285 but this applied 
most strongly for victims of violent, as opposed to property, crime.286 
It is clear that serious sexual and violent offenses often devastate 
the lives of victims, providing a powerful argument for the imposition of 
stern punishment for the perpetrators of such crimes.  Given the signifi-
cance of these offenses, community protection from this type of behavior 
should be a cardinal consideration.  Mitigation normally accorded to of-
fenders for criminal acts should be negated if there is a substantial like-
lihood that the inmate would reoffend if released prior to his or her orig-
inal release date. 
A disproportionate number of serious sexual and violent offenses 
are committed by repeat offenders.287  Thus, offenders who have com-
mitted serious sexual and violent offenses are statistically more likely to 
commit such offenses than other people.  They present a meaningful risk 
of serious offense to the community.  Thus, the reforms such as our pro-
posed hard-time loading, which could potentially result in serious sexual 
and violent offenders being released earlier, should be implemented with 
a significant degree of caution—and arguably not at all. 
A sensible compromise that applies in relation to this cohort of of-
fenders is to only apply hard-time credits to inmates who are serving 
time for sexual and violent offenses who are not likely to reoffend on 
release.  This would require accurate predictions to be made of an of-
fender’s likely risk of recidivism.  Until recently, such predictions were 
inherently unreliable. 
However, in recent years instruments have been developed which 
provide relatively accurate predictions of an offender’s risk profile.  
These tools come in two main forms. The first form is known as a risk 
assessment tool.  These instruments predict future risk on the basis of 
actuarial-based assessments288 that examine past events and seek to 
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identify variables that contributed to their occurrence.289  Developers of 
“actuarial instruments manipulate existing data in an empirical way to 
create rules.  These rules combine the more significant factors, assign 
applicable weights, and create final mechanistic rankings.”290 
A large number of risk assessment tools have been developed.  The 
key differences between the various risk assessment instruments are the 
variables that they use and the weightings that they apply to relevant 
considerations that have been ascertained as being relevant to the risk of 
future offending.  Typically, an offender’s criminal history is a constant 
base determinant.291  Other key variables are an offender’s criminal as-
sociates, pro-criminal attitudes, and antisocial personality characteris-
tics.292  One of the most sophisticated tools is the Post Conviction Risk 
Assessment (PCRA), which is currently used in relation to probation as-
sessments in the United States federal jurisdiction.293  It is more nuanced 
than many earlier predictive models because it scores not only static fac-
tors (such as prior criminal history), but also dynamic variables, includ-
ing employment status and history, education, and family relation-
ships.294 
The second form of assessment instrument that has been developed 
to predict an offender’s likelihood of reoffending is a “risk and needs” 
instrument.  This not only assesses the risk of offenders reoffending but 
also identifies the needs of those offenders that, if met, would lower their 
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probability of recidivism.295  Although these instruments are often re-
ferred to interchangeably with risk assessment tools, there are functional 
differences between them. Although risk assessments focus on measur-
ing individuals’ chances of reoffending and thus endangering the pub-
lic,296 risk and needs assessments attempt to reduce offenders’ risk of re-
cidivism by ascertaining which programs and other interventions would 
meet their needs.297  The methodology underpinning risk and needs as-
sessment tools is often termed “structured professional judgment.”298  It 
differs from a strictly actuarial approach because the “primary goal of 
this type of instrument is to provide information relevant to needs as-
sessment and a risk management plan rather than to predict antisocial 
behavior.”299  The score that results from application of this instrument 
is therefore not designed to reflect only the offender’s risk of reoffend-
ing, it is also used to guide actions that can be put in place to reduce the 
individual’s risk of recidivism. 
In the United States, risk and needs assessment tools are commonly 
used in the probation context.300  Increasingly, they are also being used 
in the sentencing process to determine the appropriate sanction.301  The 
use of the instruments is not without controversy.  Opponents argue that 
the instruments are flawed because the algorithms which underpin the 
tools can contain settings that operate unfairly against minority groups.  
Thus, researchers have suggested that although the tools may not be 
overtly racist, they can have this effect by possibly incorporating factors 
that operate as proxies for race, such as the educational level of an of-
fender.302  The indicia which are considered by risk and needs assess-
ments tools in some parts of the United States are not transparent and, 
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hence, it is difficult to firmly rebut criticism of this nature.303  Despite 
this, the first state appellate decision to expressly consider the appropri-
ateness of risk and needs assessment in sentencing was the Indiana case 
of Malenchik v. State,304 which expressly noted that “evidence-based as-
sessment instruments can be significant sources of valuable information 
for judicial consideration in deciding whether to suspend all or part of a 
sentence.”305  Moreover, objections that the tools incorporate inappro-
priate variables, such as race, can be overcome if the indicia that drive 
the tool are transparent. 
There are various versions of such tools.  One of the most widely 
utilized is the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS),306 and this pro-
vides an example of the variables that are used by these instruments.  The 
ORAS evaluates eight risk and need factors: history of antisocial behav-
ior, antisocial personality patterns, antisocial cognition, antisocial asso-
ciates, the quality of family relationships, performance at school and 
work, levels of involvement in leisure and recreation, and history of sub-
stance abuse.307  It has been shown that although these instruments are 
not always accurate, they can predict reoffending patterns with approxi-
mately 70% accuracy.308  Such tools have demonstrably lowered recidi-
vism levels for high-risk offenders when programs are selected for such 
offenders based at least in part on the outcome of the needs assess-
ments.309 
Risk and need assessment tools are becoming increasingly com-
monplace and are a feature of the Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society 
Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person (“FIRST STEP”) Act, 
which received overwhelming support from the Democrats and Repub-
licans in Congress in December 2018.310  Professor of Law Douglas Ber-
man describes it as the most significant piece of sentencing legislation 
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in over two decades.311  The FIRST STEP Act will significantly reduce 
federal prison numbers, including by providing for the early release of 
thousands of non-violent and non-sexual offenders.  The Act requires the 
Attorney General to create a “Risk and Needs Assessment System” to 
ascertain all inmates’ risk of recidivism and the evidence-based recidi-
vism reduction programs that will best suit them and to provide inmates 
with access to these programs.312  The Act gives Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons (“BOP”) institutions discretion to provide incentives for prisoners to 
participate in the programs (including mandatory extra phone time).313  
Inmates who complete such programs may be able to increase the period 
that they spend in pre-release custody—in a halfway house or home con-
finement outside a BOP prison—or begin their supervised release term 
up to a year earlier.314  Nevertheless, offenders who have committed a 
broad range of specified offenses are ineligible to earn these time credits 
that apply to pre-release custody or supervised release.315 
Attorney General William Barr directed the Department of Justice’s 
(“DOJ”) to release a plan for the implementation of this assessment sys-
tem.316  The DOJ responded by outlining the Prisoner Assessment Tool 
Targeting Estimated Risk and Needs program in a July 2019 report.317  
Known colloquially as “PATTERN,” this program is the DOJ’s vision 
for how the algorithm will look in practice.318  In addition to the logistics 
of implementing this program, the report also identified those compo-
nents that the DOJ believed to be effective in any type of risk and needs 
assessment program.319  Although these components are somewhat ge-
neric, they provide insight into the DOJ’s goals for the program.  The 
DOJ highlights four components of an effective assessment tool: (1) Dy-
namic Individualized Assessment; (2) Periodic Re-Validation and 
 
 311. Douglas A. Berman, Prez Trump Signs Historic (Though Modest) First Step Act into 
Law … and Now Comes the Critical Work of Implementing It Well!!, SENT’G L. & POL’Y 
BLOG (Dec. 21, 2018, 2:21 PM), https://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_pol-
icy/2018/12/prez-trump-signs-historic-though-modest-first-step-act-into-law-and-now-
comes-the-critical-work-of-i.html. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. See generally Edward J. Latessa & Brian Lovins, The Role of Offender Risk Assess-
ment: A Policy Maker Guide, 5 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 203 (2010). 
 316. See Jeff Mordock, Attorney General William Barr Reaffirms Commitment to Crimi-
nal Justice Reform, THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.washington-
times.com/news/2019/mar/4/william-barr-reaffirms-commitment-first-step-act-c/. 
 317. The First Step Act of 2018: Risk and Needs Assessment System, OFF. ATT’Y GEN. vi 
(July 19, 2019). 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 2020] THE CRUELTY OF SUPERMAX DETENTION 145 
Update; (3) Racial and Ethnic Neutrality; and (4) Assessment of Crimi-
nogenic Needs.320 
If hard-time credits are to be applied to sexual and violent offenders 
for time spent in supermax confinement, this should only occur when 
there is some basis for confidence that the offenders will not reoffend.  
Pragmatically, this means that a risk and needs instrument needs to be 
applied to such offenders, and only if the results indicate a low risk of 
recidivation should the credit be applied.  This, of course, entails that 
some supermax prisoners will be denied recognition for the additional 
suffering they have endured.  The interest of community safety, how-
ever, trumps the principle of proportionality. 
F. Offenders who Game the System 
The other cohort of prisoners that hard-time credits should be de-
nied to are those who deliberately behave in a manner to attract such 
credits by being placed in supermax conditions.  As noted above, people 
vary considerably in terms of their resilience, preferences, and priorities.  
Although many people would find supermax conditions to border on in-
tolerable, some people will find these conditions less oppressive than 
serving a longer sentence and will be able to function in this climate—
at least to the extent that they are confident they can endure the hardship 
until it ceases.  If a policy is implemented that supermax conditions de-
rive a hard-time credit, it is likely that some prisoners will undertake a 
cost-benefit assessment and opt to be placed in supermax conditions in 
order to be released from prison earlier. 
As we have seen, many situations that result in offenders being 
placed in supermax conditions are beyond their control, for example, 
when they are in protective custody.  But often it is the voluntary acts of 
prisoners that lead to this confinement, such as where they assault an-
other prisoner (although this obviously would not relate to acts of self-
defense).321  It will generally not be possible to discern with confidence 
whether such voluntary acts were merely poor judgment or deliberate 
attempts to earn hard-time credits.  To deal with this complexity, the 
solution is to reduce hard-time credits for a second and subsequent vol-
untary transgression that lands an offender in supermax confinement.  
This way, even if an offender is attempting to game the system, it can 
only be moderately effective.  To deny any hard-time credits for even 
voluntary acts which result in an offender being placed in supermax de-
tention is arguably too harsh an outcome.  The best manner in which to 
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balance the desire to discourage offenders gaming supermax credits, 
while recognizing the reality of the additional burden associated with 
supermax conditions is to reduce the size of hard-time credits with each 
voluntary infraction that results in an offender being placed in supermax 
detention.  Thus, the second period in supermax detention which stems 
from a voluntary infraction would see the hard time credits reduced by 
50% and the third by another 50% from the contracted amount, as so on.  
Thus, by way of example, the third period of detention leading from a 
voluntary infraction would result in the offender only receiving a 25% 
of the total discount that is attributable to time spent in supermax condi-
tions. 
G. Prisoners Serving Life Terms 
There are two additional cohorts of prisoners to whom our proposal 
for hard-time credits cannot apply.  Prisoners who have been sentenced 
to death or life imprisonment are obviously ineligible to be released 
early.  There are approximately 2,500 prisoners on death row322 and ap-
proximately 160,000 serving life terms.  In principle, supermax hard-
time credits should apply to all prisoners who experience these condi-
tions.  However, pragmatism can often stifle the operation of principle.  
This does not necessarily reveal a shortcoming with the principle, rather 
it is a concession to the other policies and practices.  The solution to 
expanding the range of prisoners to whom our proposal applies rests with 
changing sentencing practices to more appropriately reflect the principle 
of proportionality.  This would see the use of life imprisonment substan-
tially curtailed.  There is ample scope for this to occur, especially for 
example in the federal jurisdiction, where two-thirds of prisoners serving 
life terms have not committed violent or sexual offenses.323 
The fact that federal lawmakers are retrospectively reducing prison 
terms for some cohorts of federal prisoners provides some optimism that 
this approach may be expanded to more prisoner cohorts.324  Beyond 
this, the imperative to reduce the length and severity of prison terms for 
large numbers of prisoners is beyond the scope of this Article.325 
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H. Incidental Benefit of Hard-Time Credits – Less Resort to Supermax 
The case for hard-time credits, as we have seen, stems mainly from 
the imperative for doctrinal and jurisprudential coherence, and in partic-
ular from the need to give effect to the proportionality principle.  In ad-
dition, adopting this recommendation will beneficially promote the abo-
lition or significantly curtailment of the use of supermax confinement. 
Lawmakers do not have an interest in offenders being released early 
from prison.  It is for this reason that “Truth in Sentencing” legislation 
was passed in most states and the federal jurisdiction over the past few 
decades.326  The aim of these legislative schemes is to “reduce the appar-
ent disparity between court-imposed sentences and the time offenders 
actually serve in prison.”327  Lawmakers recognize that from a principled 
and pragmatic perspective, they desire transparency regarding the sen-
tences that offenders actually serve. 
Hard-time credits for time spent in supermax conditions obviously 
have the capacity to reduce the apparent efficacy of truth in sentencing 
schemes and, hence, lawmakers will be motivated to ensure that super-
max detention is only used when there is good reason for doing so, such 
as when an offender acts violently towards others and there is a risk of 
future similar behavior.  However, it is feasible for lawmakers to make 
rules or for corrections officials to enact protocols that ensure that super-
max conditions are not utilized for non-essential reasons.  There are cur-
rently few legal limits to the use of supermax conditions.  At present, 
prisoners are sometimes sent to supermax confinement as punishment 
for minor transgressions of prison rules or because of the lack of cells in 
other parts of the system.328  Providing hard-time credits for time spent 
in supermax conditions will encourage lawmakers and prison officials to 
considerably limit the circumstances in which prisoners are forced to en-
dure supermax conditions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Imprisonment is a severe hardship.  It is for this reason that it con-
stitutes the most serious sanction in our system of law—apart from cap-
ital punishment, which appropriately is a rarely-implemented sanc-
tion.329  In evaluating the hardship of prison, the only relevant measure 
for sentencing purposes is the length of the prison term.  This is an error.  
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Although conditions vary considerably, and the diversity of the condi-
tions is typically a matter of degree, this is not always the case.  Some-
times the difference is manifestly stark—so much so that the forms of 
punishment are effectively different in nature.  Generally, all mainstream 
imprisonment conditions involve offenders being out of their cell for 
several hours per day; contacting other prisoners; visiting rights; and ac-
cessing basic amenities such as libraries and exercise facilities.  Super-
max conditions stand apart from this construct. They involve imprison-
ment within imprisonment.  They are constrictive to the extreme and 
involve removing every aspect of stimulation and engagement from a 
person.  They are isolationist to the extreme and cause immense suffer-
ing.  They are so different from conventional prison conditions that they 
constitute a different form of hardship and thereby a different form of 
punishment. 
The brutal nature of supermax conditions has been increasingly rec-
ognized in recent times.  Although commendable efforts have been un-
dertaken to minimize the effects of supermax conditions on certain 
groups of inmates, no states have undertaken the effort that would re-
solve the issue completely—the total banning of supermax.330  Despite 
these commendable efforts, the number of prisoners in supermax condi-
tions has not been meaningfully reduced.  Hence, solutions other than 
seeking the abolition or radical reduction of supermax numbers should 
be considered. 
In this Article, we have recommended that a doctrinally coherent 
and pragmatic approach to supermax conditions requires a premium to 
be added for time spent in supermax conditions.  There is no objective 
mathematical formula that can be applied to determine the correct quo-
tient for this loading, but the reduction must be meaningful.  We suggest 
that prisoners should receive a discount should of 50% of the time that 
they are confined in supermax conditions, with limited exceptions.  In 
other words, prisoners should receive two days of credit for each day 
they spend in supermax conditions.  This is a sizeable discount.  It is 
justified by the facts that the burden of imprisonment has a quantitative 
component (i.e., the length of the term) and a qualitative component (i.e., 
the prisoner’s experience of imprisonment), and that supermax prisoners 
are far more constrained that other prisoners. 
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We propose several exceptions to this discount.  The primary ex-
ception is that the discount should not be credited to offenders who have 
committed serious sexual or violent offenses unless they are deemed to 
be at low risk of reoffending as assessed by a risk and needs assessment 
tool.  For this cohort of offenders, the aim of community protection out-
weighs the proportionality principle.  A second exception applies for 
prisoners who game the system in order to be sent to supermax condi-
tions.  Such prisoners should not receive the discount. A final exception 
applies for prisoners on death row or sentenced to life imprisonment, 
who also cannot receive the discount. 
If the recommendation in this Article is adopted, supermax condi-
tions will not be abolished.  However, supermax conditions will be em-
ployed more fairly.  Our recommendation also motivates lawmakers to 
reduce the use of supermax conditions in order to ensure that offenders 
are not released prior to the expiration of their sentence.  This motivation 
has the capacity to encourage the definition of firm guidelines limiting 
the use of supermax conditions to situations when it is absolutely neces-
sary. 
 
